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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Robert Joseph Frauenberger appeals from the judgment and sentence
entered upon the jury verdicts finding him guilty of three counts of lewd conduct
with a minor child under 16 years old and one count of delivery of marijuana to a
person under 18 years old.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Eighteen-year-old Frauenberger had sexual contact with 13-year-old S.H.
on three separate occasions between September and October 2009. (Trial Tr.,
p.11, L.20 - p.50, L.18.) On the first occasion, Frauenberger "made out" with
S.H. and "fingered" (i.e., digitally penetrated) her vagina while S.H. was sitting on
his lap in a pickup truck on the way to a place known as "Sig HilL" (Trial Tr.,
p.13, L.20 - p.24, L.13.) On the second occasion, Frauenberger provided S.H.
with marijuana, which she and Frauenberger smoked together in Frauenberger's
car; Frauenberger then "made out" with S.H. and "fingered" her vagina, and S.H.
gave Frauenberger a "hand job." (Trial Tr., p.30, L.17 - p.41, L.24.) On the third
occasion, Frauenberger drove S.H. to his father's shop and, on a mattress inside
the shop, Frauenberger provided S.H. with marijuana, "made out" with her,
"fingered' her vagina and performed oral sex on her. (Trial Tr., p.42, L.12 - p.50,
L.18.)
The state charged Frauenberger in case number CR-2010-262 with two
counts of lewd conduct with a child under 16. (See Idaho Repository - Case

1

Number Result Page for Custer Co. Case No. CR-2010-262.

1
)

Following a

preliminary hearing, at which B.H. testified, the magistrate bound Frauenberger
over on the charges. (See Id.; CR-2010-262 Preliminary Hearing Tr., pp.1-25.)
A criminal information was thereafter filed but, pursuant to the state's motion, the
information was dismissed without prejudice on November 24, 2010. (See Idaho
Repository - Case Number Result Page for Custer Co. Case No. CR-2010-262.)
Five days later, the state initiated the instant case by charging
Frauenberger with three counts of lewd conduct with a minor child under 16
years old and two counts of delivering marijuana to a person under 18 years old.
(R., pp.9-12.)

Each count of the criminal complaint identified the 13-year-old

B.H. by the pseudonym "Bonnie Noe" (R., pp.9-12); however, the probable cause
affidavit filed in conjunction with the complaint identified the victim as 13-year-old
[B.H.], and the facts presented in the affidavit - including the date, location and
nature of each instance of lewd conduct and marijuana delivery - otherwise
matched the allegations of the complaint (compare R., pp.9-12 with R., pp.1316). Frauenberger waived a preliminary hearing on the charges (R., p.1), and
the state thereafter filed a Criminal Information and three amended informations,
all of which used the pseudonym "Bonnie Noe" to identify the victim (R., pp.1821,37-40,46-49,75-78).

1 Contemporaneously with the filing of this brief, the state is filing a motion
requesting the Idaho Supreme Court to take judicial notice of the Idaho
Repository - Case Number Result Page for Custer County Case No. CR-2010262 and to augment the appellate record with the already prepared transcript of
the preliminary hearing that was conducted in that case on June 28, 2010.

2

At trial, B.H. testified that Frauenberger engaged in sexual acts with her
on three separate occasions between September and October 2009. (Trial Tr.,
p.11, L.20 - p.50, L.18.)

Aside from the fact that the information used the

pseudonym "Bonnie Noe," B.H.'s recounting of each incident was otherwise
consistent with the factual allegations contained in Counts I-III of the information.
(Compare Trial Tr., p.11, L.20 - p.50, L.18 with R, pp.75-76.) B.H. also testified,
consistent with the allegations of Count V of the information (with the exception
of the victim's name), that Frauenberger provided her with marijuana before
engaging in sex acts with her.2 (Compare Trial Tr., p.36, L.24 - p.50, L.10 with
R, p.77.)

On cross-examination, in response to defense counsel's question

whether she was "Bonnie No [sic]," B.H. responded, "I guess, yeah." (Trial Tr.,
p.83, Ls.23-24.)
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Frauenberger guilty of all three
counts of lewd conduct and the single remaining count of delivering marijuana to
a person under 18 years old. (R, pp.107-08.) Frauenberger filed a motion for a
new trial, alleging prosecutorial misconduct. (R, pp.119-23.) The district court
denied the motion (R, pp.133-34) and thereafter imposed concurrent unified
sentences of 10 years with four years fixed for each of the lewd conduct charges,
and four years with one year fixed for the marijuana delivery charge (Judgment

Because there was no testimony that Frauenberger provided B.H. with
marijuana "at the top of Big Hill" as alleged in Count IV of the information (see
R, p.77), the prosecutor, at the close of the state's case-in-chief and in response
to defense counsel's motion, stipulated to the dismissal of that charge (Trial Tr.,
p.265, L.21 - p.267, L.18).
2

3

of Conviction (augmentation); Sentencing Tr., p.421 , L.25 Frauenberger timely appeals. (R., pp.139-42.)
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p.422, L.20).

ISSUES
Frauenberger states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Was the evidence presented at trial insufficient to support
the jury's verdicts finding Mr. Frauenberger guilty of lewd
conduct or delivery of marijuana to Bonnie Noe?

2.

Were the charges for which Mr. Frauenberger was ultimately
convicted, related to criminal conduct involving a minor
victim B.H., charges for which no information or indictment
had been filed and for which subject matter jurisdiction had
not been conferred?

3.

Did the district court create a fatal variance from the State's
information when it instructed the jury that the charges
involved the minor victim B.H. instead of Bonnie Noe as
alleged in the information?

4.

Did the State violate Mr. Frauenberger's right to a fair trial by
committing prosecutorial misconduct?

5.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed,
upon Mr. Frauenberger, unified sentences of ten years, with
two years fixed, for the lewd conduct charges, and four
years, with one year fixed, for the delivery of marijuana
charge, to be served concurrently?

(Appellant's brief, p.B.)
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
1.

Has Frauenberger failed to show that the district court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction over the charges of which he was ultimately convicted?

2.

Did the state present sUbstantial competent evidence to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt all of the essential elements of the crimes of which
Frauenberger was ultimately convicted?

3.

Has Frauenberger failed to establish fundamental error entitling him to
review for the first time on appeal of his unpreserved variance claim?

4.

Has Frauenberger failed to show he is entitled to relief on any of his
claims of prosecutorial misconduct?

5

5.

Has Frauenberger failed to establish an abuse of the district court's
sentencing discretion?

6

ARGUMENT
/.
Frauenberger Has Failed To Show Any Jurisdictional Defect In The Charging
Document
A.

Introduction
For the first time on appeal, Frauenberger argues that the charging

document failed to confer subject matter jurisdiction with respect to the charges
of which he was ultimately convicted. (Appellant's brief, pp.12-15.) Specifically,
he contends that the charging document was jurisdictionally defective because it
used the pseudonym "Bonnie Noe" instead of the victim's actual name.
Frauenberger's argument is without merit.

(ld.)

The charging document alleged

criminal offenses committed in the State of Idaho and, as such, was not
jurisdictionally defective. Frauenberger's claim that the charging document was
defective because it identified the victim by a pseudonym is, at best, a claim of a
lack of notice, which Frauenberger waived by failing to raise before trial.

B.

Standard Of Review
Whether a charging document conforms to the requirements of the law,

including whether it confers subject matter jurisdiction, is a question over which
the appellate court exercises free review. State v. Jones, 140 Idaho 755, 757,
101 P.3d 699, 701 (2004); State v. Robran, 119 Idaho 285, 287, 805 P.2d 491,
493 (Ct. App. 1991).

7

C.

The Charging Document Conferred Subject Matter Jurisdiction With
Respect To Each Of The Charges Of Which Frauenberger Was
Convicted
"The information, indictment, or complaint alleging an offense was

committed within the state of Idaho confers subject matter jurisdiction upon the
court." State v. Rogers, 140 Idaho 223, 228, 91 P.3d 1127, 1133 (2004) (citing
State v. Slater, 71 Idaho 335,338,231 P.2d 424, 425 (1951)). Where, as here,
a jurisdictional challenge to the charging document is not made before trial, the
charging document must be liberally construed in favor of imparting jurisdiction.
State v. Jones, 140 Idaho 755, 758-59, 101 P.3d 699, 702-03 (2004).
Specifically, a charging document will confer jurisdiction if it "contains a
statement of the territorial jurisdiction of the court and a citation to the applicable
section of the Idaho Code." State v. Quintero, 141 Idaho 619, 622, 115 P.3d
710, 713 (2005).
The Third Amended Criminal Information, upon which Frauenberger stood
trial, alleged that Frauenberger committed three counts of lewd conduct with a
child under 16 years old and two counts of delivering marijuana to a person
under 18 years old.

(R., pp.75-78.)

Each offense was alleged to have been

committed in Custer County, Idaho, and each count cited the section of the
Idaho Code Frauenberger was alleged to have violated.

(ld.)

Because the

information alleged that Frauenberger committed criminal offenses in the state of
Idaho, the information alleged all the facts necessary to establish subject matter
jurisdiction under the rules applicable to informations and indictments. Quintero,

8

141 Idaho at 622, 115 P.3d at 713; Jones, 140 Idaho at 757-58, 101 P.3d at
701-02.
Frauenberger concedes on appeal that the charging document was
sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction as to charges involving the alleged
victim, "Bonnie Noe."

(Appellant's brief, p.13.)

He argues, however, that

because "he had never been charged for crimes associated with an alleged
victim named B.H .... there was no jurisdiction for the district court to instruct the
jury on crimes related to B.H."

(Id., pp.13-14.)

To support his argument,

Frauenberger cites State v. Lenz, 103 Idaho 632,633-34,651 P.2d 566, 567-68
(Ct. App. 1982), and I.C. § 19-1409 for the proposition that "[a] legally sufficient
information must adequately set forth the nature and circumstances of the
offense charged to enable a person of ordinary understanding to know what is
intended in the charge." (Appellant's brief, pp.14-15.) Frauenberger's argument
is without merit because it conflates the concepts of lack of jurisdiction, which
may be raised for the first time on appeal, and lack of notice, any claim of which
is waived if not raised as an issue before trial.
Rule 12(b)(2) of the Idaho Criminal Rules requires that all nonjurisdictional defenses or objections based on defects in the charging document
be raised before the trial. If a challenge to a charging document "is one of due
process, such as whether the charging document sufficiently advises the
defendant of the nature of the charge, then it is waived if not raised prior to the
commencement of the trial or entry of a guilty plea." Quintero, 141 Idaho at 622,
115 P.3d at 713.

9

Here, Frauenberger claims that the charging document did not confer
jurisdiction because it used the pseudonym "Bonnie Noe" instead of the victim's
actual name.

(Appellant's brief, pp.12-15.)

As set forth above and as

Frauenberger all but concedes (Id., p.13), the only jurisdictional requirements of
a charging document are that it contain a statement of territorial jurisdiction and
a citation to the statutory provision(s) the defendant is alleged to have violated.
Quintero, 141 Idaho at 622, 115 P.3d at 713.

There is no jurisdictional

requirement that the charging document also use the victim's actual name. Such
information instead serves solely to provide the defendant notice of the nature
and circumstances of the charge.

Accordingly, Frauenberger's claim that the

charging document was defective because it identified the victim by a
pseudonym is, at best, a claim of a lack of notice. Because Frauenberger did
not timely assert this claim before trial, the claim is waived and should not be
considered by this Court on appeal.

kL.

II.
Frauenberger Has Failed To Show That The Evidence Was Not Sufficient To
Support His Convictions
A.

Introduction
Frauenberger challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his

convictions. (Appellant's brief, pp.9-12.) Specifically, he contends that the state
failed to present sUbstantial competent evidence from which the jury could find
beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed lewd conduct with and delivered
marijuana to "Bonnie Noe," the pseudonym used to identify the victim in the
charging document.

(Id.)

Frauenberger's argument fails.

10

The name of the

victim is not a statutory element of either lewd conduct with a minor under 16 or
delivery of marijuana to a person under 18 and, as such, the state was not
required to prove it at trial. Because a review of the record and applicable law
shows that the state presented substantial competent evidence on every
statutory element of the charged crimes, Frauenberger has failed to show any
basis for reversal.

B.

Standard Of Review
An appellate court will not set aside a judgment of conviction entered

upon a jury verdict if there is substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of
fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt. State v. Reyes, 121 Idaho 570, 826 P.2d 919 (Ct. App. 1992); State v.
Hart, 112 Idaho 759, 761, 735 P.2d 1070, 1072 (Ct. App. 1987). In conducting
this review the appellate court will not substitute its view for that of the jury as to
the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, or the
reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence.

State v. Knutson, 121

Idaho 101, 822 P.2d 998 (Ct. App. 1991); Hart, 112 Idaho at 761, 735 P.2d at
1072.

Moreover, the facts, and inferences to be drawn from those facts, are

construed in favor of upholding the jury's verdict. State v. Hughes, 130 Idaho
698, 701, 946 P.2d 1338, 1341 (Ct. App. 1997); Hart, 112 Idaho at 761, 735
P.2d at 1072.

11

C.

The State Presented Substantial Competent Evidence To Prove The
Essential Elements Of The Charged Crimes
Frauenberger was charged with three counts of lewd conduct with a minor

child under 16 years old and two counts of delivering marijuana to a person
under 18 years old (R., pp.75-78), one count of which was dismissed pursuant to
a defense motion (Trial Tr., p.267, Ls.12-18).

To prove the lewd conduct

charges, the state was required to prove that Frauenberger committed a "lewd or
lascivious act or acts upon or with the body or any part or member thereof of a
minor child under the age of sixteen (16) years, including but not limited to,
genital-genital contact, oral-genital contact,

anal-genital contact, oral-anal

contact, manual-anal contact, or manual genital contact," and that he did so "with
the intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust or passions or sexual
desires of such person, such minor child, or [aJ third party." I.C. § 18-1508. To
prove the marijuana delivery charge, the state was required to prove that, when
Frauenberger was "eighteen (18) years of age or over," he distributed marijuana
to "a person under eighteen (18) years of age who is at least three (3) years his
junior." I.C. §§ 37-2732(a) and 37-2737. Even a cursory review of the record
shows that the state proved each of these essential elements of the charged
crimes beyond a reasonable doubt.
B.H. testified that Frauenberger engaged in sexual activities with her on
three separate occasions when she was 13 years old. (Trial Tr., p.10, L.12p.50, L.18.) On the first occasion, Frauenberger put his finger in B.H.'s vagina
(Trial Tr., p.20, L.1 - p.24, L.13); on the second occasion, Frauenberger put his
finger in B.H.'s vagina, and B.H. stroked Frauenberger's penis with her hand

12

(Trial Tr., p.30, L.17 - p.41, L.24); and on the third occasion, Frauenberger put
his finger in B.H.'s vagina and performed oral sex her (Trial Tr., p.42, L.12 p.50, L.18).

B.H. also testified that, on two of those occasions, Frauenberger

provided her with marijuana. (Trial Tr., p.36, L.24 - p.39, L.8, p.45, L.24 - p.48,
L.5.) Frauenberger himself testified that he was 18 years old when the crimes
were alleged to have occurred. (Trial Tr., p.270, Ls.10-19.) Construing these
facts and the inferences to be drawn therefrom in favor of upholding the jury's
verdicts, it is clear that the state presented substantial evidence to support the
jury's findings on each of the essential elements of the charged crimes.
On appeal, Frauenberger does not dispute that the state proved all the
statutory elements of charged crimes. Instead, he argues that the evidence was
insufficient to sustain his convictions because the state failed to prove that the
victim's name was "Bonnie Noe," the pseudonym used in the charging
document. (Appellant's brief, pp.9-12.) The state acknowledges that the only
evidence presented at trial on this issue came when defense counsel asked B.H.
on cross-examination, "I'm taking it you are Bonnie Noe?" and B.H. responded, "I
guess, yeah." (Trial Tr., p.83, Ls.23-24.) Whether this testimony was sufficient
to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that B.H. and "Bonnie Noe" were the
same person is irrelevant to a sufficiency of the evidence analysis, however,
because the name of the victim is not an element of any of the charged crimes.
It is axiomatic that due process requires the state in every criminal case to
prove the essential elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

~,

Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277-78 (1993); In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,

13

364 (1970). Contrary to Frauenberger's apparent belief, it is the criminal statute,
not the charging document, that defines the essential elements of a crime. State
v. Harrison, 147 Idaho 678, 681, 214 P.3d 664, 667 (Ct. App. 2009) (legislature
defines elements of a crime); State v. Nevarez, 142 Idaho 616, 620, 130 P.3d
1154, 1158 (Ct. App. 2005) (same); Baxter v. State, 149 Idaho 859, 863, 243
P.3d 675, 679 (Ct. App. 2010) (referring to statute to discern essential elements
of crime).

Neither the lewd conduct statute nor the marijuana delivery statute

require as an essential element proof of the victim's name. Instead, the statutes
require, respectively, proof that the defendant committed a "lewd or lascivious
act or acts upon or with the body or any part or member thereof of a minor child

under the age of sixteen (16) years," I.C. § 18-1508 (emphasis added), and
proof that the defendant distributed marijuana to "a person under eighteen (8)

years of age who is at least three (3) years his junior' I.C. § 37-2737
(emphasis added).

Because the evidence presented at trial unequivocally

showed that B.H. was a minor child under the age of 16 years old and was also
more than three years Frauenberger's junior, there can be no question that the
state proved these essential elements of the lewd conduct and marijuana
delivery charges beyond a reasonable doubt.
The state acknowledges that, as a general matter, the evidence presented
by the state at trial should conform to the allegations of the charging document.
Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100, 105 (1979). However, where, as here, the
charging document and the evidence differ with respect to a factual allegation
that is not an essential element of the crime, there is no sufficiency of the
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evidence problem; at best, the issue is one of a possible variance affecting the
defendant's due process rights to notice and protection from double jeopardy.3
~

(citing Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935)) (UA variance arises when

the evidence adduced at trial establishes facts different from those alleged in an
indictment.").
Because the name of the victim is not a statutory element of either lewd
conduct with a minor under 16 or delivery of marijuana to a person under 18, the
state was not required to prove it at trial. Frauenberger has failed to show any
basis for reversal.

III.
Frauenberger Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error Entitling Him To Appellate
Review Of His Unpreserved Variance Claim
A.

Introduction
For the first time on appeal, Frauenberger argues that "the district court

created a fatal variance from the state's information when it instructed the jury
that the charges involved the minor victim B.H., instead of Bonnie Noe as alleged
in the information."
omitted).)

(Appellant's brief, p.17 (capitalization altered, underlining

This Court must decline to review Frauenberger's unpreserved

variance claim because Frauenberger has failed to demonstrate from the record
that the complained of variance rises to the level of fundamental error.

3 Apparently recognizing this, Frauenberger has actually raised a variance claim
on appeal. (See Appellant's brief, pp.15-20.) As explained in Section III, infra,
this Court must decline to consider the claim because Frauenberger did not raise
it below and he has failed on appeal to demonstrate fundamental error.
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B.

Standard Of Review
"It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely

objection must be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for
appeaL" State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000).
Absent a timely objection, the appellate courts of this state will only review an
alleged error under the fundamental error doctrine. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho
209,227-28,245 P.3d 961,979-80 (2010).
Whether there is a variance between a charging document and the jury
instructions at trial, and whether such variance is fatal to the conviction, are
questions of law given free review on appeal. State v. Sherrod, 131 Idaho 56,
57,951 P.2d 1283, 1284 (Ct. App. 1998).

C.

Frauenberger Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error Entitling Him To
Appellate Review Of His Unpreserved Variance Claim
"A variance arises when the evidence adduced at trial establishes facts

different from those alleged in the indictment." Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S.
100, 105 (1979). A variance also occurs where the jury instructions given at trial
allow the jury to convict the defendant of the charged crime, but on one or more
alternative theories than alleged in the charging document. See, M:., State v.
Windsor, 110 Idaho 410,716 P.2d 1182 (1985); State v. Montoya, 140 Idaho
160, 166,90 P.3d 910, 916 (Ct. App. 2004). Not all variances are fatal: "[T]here
is a marked distinction between a 'mere variance' and a variance which is
automatically fatal because it amounts to an impermissible 'constructive
amendment.'"

State v. Jones, 140 Idaho 41, 49, 89 P.3d 881, 889 (Ct. App.
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2003) (quoting State v. Colwell, 124 Idaho 560, 565-566, 861 P.2d 1225, 12301231 (Ct. App. 1993». A variance between the information used to charge a
defendant and the instructions given at trial constitutes a due process violation if
it deprives a defendant of fair notice of the charges against him or subjects him
to a risk of double jeopardy. Montoya, 140 Idaho at 164-66, 90 P.3d at 914-16.
A defendant is deprived of fair notice only if he was misled or embarrassed in the
preparation or presentation of his defense. State v. Hickman, 146 Idaho 178,
182,191 P.3d 1098, 1103 (2008).
Frauenberger argues for the first time on appeal that the district court
created a fatal variance by instructing the jury that the victim of the charged
crimes was B.H., when the charging document actually identified the victim by
the pseudonym, "Bonnie Noe." (Appellant's brief, pp.15-20; compare R., pp.7577 (information identifying victim of charged crimes as "Bonnie Noe") with R.,
pp.89-91 and Instruction No. 10 (augmentation) (elements instructions identifying
victim as "B.H.").)

Frauenberger concedes he did not preserve his variance

claim by way of a timely objection below, but argues he is nevertheless entitled
to review of this claim and, ultimately, to relief thereon because the error is
fundamental. (Appellant's brief, pp.16-17.) Frauenberger is incorrect.
Under the Idaho Supreme Court's recent opinion in State v. Perry, 150
Idaho 209, 245 P.3d 961 (2010), unobjected to claims of constitutional error are
reviewed using a three-part test:
(1) the defendant must demonstrate that one or more of the
defendant's unwaived constitutional rights were violated; (2) the
error must be clear or obvious, without the need for any additional
information not contained in the appellate record, including
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information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical
decision; and (3) the defendant must demonstrate that the error
affected the defendant's substantial rights, meaning (in most
instances) that it must have affected the outcome of the trial
proceedings.
150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978 (footnote omitted). Application of this test to
the facts of this case shows Frauenberger has failed to carry his burden of
demonstrating that the variance he claims rises to the level of fundamental error.
The first prong of the fundamental error test requires Frauenberger to
demonstrate a constitutional violation. Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978.
Frauenberger argues he has satisfied this step in the analysis merely by claiming
a variance between the charging document and the jury instructions because
such claim necessarily implicates his due process rights.

(Appellant's brief,

pp.16-17.) Frauenberger is mistaken. Although an actual variance between the
instructions and the allegations of a charging document implicates due process,
~,

State v. Gilman, 105 Idaho 891, 893,673 P.2d 1085, 1088 (Ct. App. 1983),

no due process violation actually occurs unless the variance affects the
defendant's substantial rights by either "depriv[ing] the defendant of his right to
fair notice or leav[ing] him open to the risk of double jeopardy," State v. Montoya,
140 Idaho 160, 165, 90 P.3d 910, 915 (Ct. App. 2004) (citing State v. Windsor,
110 Idaho 410, 417-18, 716 P.2d 1182, 1189-90 (1985) (footnote omitted)).
Where, as here, a variance exists between the victim's name as alleged in
the charging document and the victim's name as proven and/or instructed on at
trial, such variance is not fatal (i.e., does not violate due process) "if the two
names in fact refer to the same individual, such as where a mere misnomer is
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involved or where the variance is attributable to the use of a nickname or alias by
the victim." Monfort v. State, 635 S.E.2d 336, 337-38 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006); see
also State v. Mason, 2012 WL 3172028 *2 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012) (variance
between name of victim as alleged in charging document and actual name,
which was the same but in a different order, was not fatal); Stevens v. State, 891
SW.2d 649, 650-51 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (holding fatal variance doctrine
inapplicable to pseudonym cases so long as defendant's due process right to
notice is satisfied). Even where the name alleged is not an obvious misnomer or
alias, any variance between the charging document and the proof and/or
instructions at trial is not fatal so long as 1) the defendant was not surprised by
the victim's true identity, and 2) the record contains sufficient detail to prevent a
second prosecution for the same offense. Washington v. State, 59 S.W.3d 260,
263-64 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001); cf., United States v. Simmons, 431 F.Supp.2d 38,
60-61 (D. D.C. 2006) (amending indictment to replace victim's name, "Robert,"
with nickname, "Rah-Rah," did not amount to fatal variance where defendants
were on notice as to victim's identity and record was sufficiently detailed to
protect defendants from second prosecution for same crimes).
Applying these principles, the court in Washington, supra, rejected
Washington's argument that a fatal variance existed between the indictment,
which alleged that Washington sexually assaulted "M.L.," and the proof at trial of
the victim's full legal name, which began with the initials "M.L." 59 S.W.3d at
262.

Applying Texas law, the court first held that "M.L." was an obvious

pseudonym for the victim's full legal name and, as such, "the fatal variance
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doctrine and Washington's due process right to notice [were] not implicated."

kL.

at 262-63. The court then went on to explain that, "[e]ven if M.L. were not an
obvious pseudonym, ... the variance in the indictment [was] not material"
because the record showed that Washington was not surprised by the victim's
true identity and, given the evidence presented at trial, there was no risk that
Washington would be subject to a second prosecution for the same crime.

kL. at

263-64. In reaching this conclusion, the court found it significant that, in pretrial
discovery, the state had provided Washington with records bearing the victim's
legal name.

kL.

at 263.

Even "[m]ore significantly," the court found that

Washington's "lack of surprise [could] be inferred from a silent record, as
[Washington] could reasonably be expected to protest if the victim's name were
not properly disclosed."

kL.

The court observed:

Washington never objected at trial that he was unaware of
the victim's name or that he was unable to prepare an adequate
defense. He did not raise mistaken identity or alibi as issues in his
defense; rather, his defense was that the victim consented to the
sexual contact.
Further, there is no risk that Washington is susceptible to
prosecution for the same crime. M.L. testified that Washington
assaulted her, and DNA evidence was admitted showing that
Washington had sexual contact with M.L.

kL. at

263-64. Because Washington failed to show from the record that he was

deprived of notice or at risk of double jeopardy, the variance he claimed was
immaterial and did not violate his due process rights.

~

at 263-64.

Like Washington, Frauenberger has failed to demonstrate that the
variance he claims is of constitutional significance. The record in this case is
replete with evidence that Frauenberger knew the victim's name was actually
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B.H., as opposed to the pseudonym "Bonnie Noe" used in the charging
document.

B.H.'s full name appears in the probable cause affidavit that was

submitted with the complaint. (R., pp.13-16.) In addition, B.H. testified and was
examined by Frauenberger's counsel at the preliminary hearing in the original
case (see generally CR-2010-262 Preliminary Hearing Tr.) and also testified at
an evidentiary hearing on the state's motion to revoke Frauenberger's pretrial
release in the case that is the subject of this appeal (see R., pp.64-65). When
B.H. took the stand at trial, Frauenberger's counsel attempted to impeach her
with her preliminary hearing testimony in the originally filed case. (Trial Tr., p.81,
L.15 - p.82, L.15, p.88, L.1 - p.93, L.16, p.97, L.13 - p.100, L.24, p.102, L.23p.104, L.21.) During that same cross-examination, Frauenberger's counsel
asked, "I'm taking it you're Bonnie No [sic]," and B.H. responded, "I guess, yeah."
(Trial Tr., p.83, Ls.23-24.) Thus, far from demonstrating any lack of notice, the
record clearly shows that Frauenberger was aware throughout both the pretrial
and trial proceedings that B.H. and "Bonnie Noe" were the same individual.
In addition to being clear from the record, Frauenberger's lack of surprise
can also be inferred from fact that he never objected at trial that he was unaware
of the victim's name and never argued that he was unable to prepare an
adequate defense. Frauenberger's defense at trial was that the sexual contact
and marijuana delivery B.H. testified to did not happen. (See generally Trial Tr.,
pp.269-96; 4/28/11 Tr., pp.198-210.) He never claimed to not know who B.H.
was, nor did he ever claim that the discrepancy between the charging document
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and the evidence and instructions at trial in any way misled him or hampered his
ability to prepare a defense.
Frauenberger has also failed to demonstrate that the complained of
variance exposes him to the risk of double jeopardy.

While the information

alleged crimes against "Bonnie Noe," a comparison of the specific allegations of
the charging document with B.H.'s testimony at trial shows that the crimes with
which Frauenberger was charged and the crimes of which he was ultimately
convicted were uniquely similar in their details, such that there is no reasonable
possibility that Frauenberger could be subject to a second prosecution for the
same offenses. (Compare, R., pp.75-77 with Trial Tr., p.11, L.20 - p.50, L.18.)
Having failed to demonstrate from the record that he was actually deprived of fair
notice or exposed to the risk of double jeopardy, Frauenberger has failed to
show that the variance he claims for the first time on appeal rises to the level of a
constitutional violation.

Frauenberger has therefore failed to satisfy the first

element of Perry.
The second element of a claim of fundamental error is that the alleged
error is "clear or obvious, without the need for any additional information not
contained in the appellate record, including information as to whether the failure
to object was a tactical decision." Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978
(footnote omitted). Frauenberger cannot satisfy this element because he cannot
show from the appellate record that he would have conducted his defense
differently, as explained above. In addition, while no explanation for the use of
the pseudonym appears in record, the most reasonable inference is that the
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prosecutor was attempting to protect B.H.'s identity. This was obviously defense
counsel's understanding, as he specifically clarified with B.H. that she was
"Bonnie No [sic]" and then questioned B.H. extensively about the specific
allegations of the charging document.

(Trial Tr., p.83, L.16 - p.106, L.25.)

Because, as demonstrated above, counsel was clearly aware that B.H. and
"Bonnie Noe" were the same individual, it is far from clear that defense counsel's
decision to not object to the discrepancy between the charging document and
the evidence and instructions at trial was anything but a tactical decision.
Indeed, counsel may have deliberately chosen to forego objecting for any
number of reasons, including counsel's determination that any variance was
immaterial and did not prejudice Frauenberger's ability to defend against the
charges. Frauenberger has failed to show that the error he claims plainly exists
on the record.
The final element of a claim of fundamental error requires Frauenberger
to "demonstrate that the error affected [his] substantial rights, meaning (in most
instances) that it must have affected the outcome of the trial proceedings."
Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. As previously indicated, a variance
affects the substantial rights of a defendant only "when it deprives the defendant
of his right to fair notice or leaves him open to the risk of double jeopardy."
Montoya, 140 Idaho at 165, 90 P.3d at 915 (citing Windsor, 110 Idaho at 417-78,
716 P.2d 1189-90 (footnote omitted)).

For the reasons already explained,

Frauenberger has failed to demonstrate that his substantial rights were affected
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by the variance he claims for the first time on appeal and has, therefore, failed to
satisfy the final element of the Perry fundamental error analysis.

IV.
Frauenberger Is Not Entitled To Relief On Any Of His
Prosecutorial Misconduct Claims
A.

Introduction
Frauenberger argues that the prosecutor committed several instances of

misconduct that prejudiced his right to a fair trial. (Appellant's brief, pp.20-38.)
Frauenberger has failed to establish any basis for reversal, however, because
the record shows that Frauenberger was not unfairly prejudiced by the only two
instances of alleged misconduct to which he objected, and he has otherwise
failed to carry his burden of demonstrating that the prosecutor's remarks during
closing argument, to which he did not object, amount to fundamental error.

B.

Standard Of Review And General Legal Standards Governing Claims Of
Prosecutorial Misconduct
"[T]he standard of review governing claims of prosecutorial misconduct

depends on whether the defendant objected to the misconduct at triaL" State v.
Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 715, 215 P.3d 414,435 (2009). If the alleged error
was followed by a contemporaneous objection at trial, the defendant bears the
initial burden on appeal of establishing that the complained of conduct was
improper. State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 59, 253 P.3d 727, 733 (2011); State
v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227, 245 P.3d 961, 979 (2010). "Where the defendant
meets his initial burden of showing that a violation occurred, the State then has
the burden of demonstrating to the appellate court beyond a reasonable doubt
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that the constitutional violation did not contribute to the jury's verdict." Perry, 150
Idaho at 227-28, 245 P.3d at 979-80. When, on the other hand, a defendant
fails to timely object at trial to allegedly improper closing arguments by the
prosecutor, the conviction will be set aside for prosecutorial misconduct only
upon a showing by the defendant that the alleged misconduct rises to the level of
fundamental error.

kL. at 228,

245 P.3d at 980.

Whether preserved by objection at trial or reviewed for fundamental error,
a mere assertion or finding that a particular question or statement was
objectionable or improper is insufficient to establish prosecutorial misconduct.
As explained by the United States Supreme Court: U[I]t is not enough that the
prosecutors' remarks were undesirable or even universally condemned.

The

relevant question is whether the prosecutors' comments so infected the trial with
unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process." Darden
v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) (internal quotations and citations
omitted); see also Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982) (,,[T]he touchstone
of due process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the
fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor. ") State v. Reynolds, 120
Idaho 445,451,816 P.2d 1002, 1008 (Ct. App. 1991) (the function of appellate
review is "not to discipline the prosecutor for misconduct, but to ensure that any
such misconduct did not interfere with the defendant's right to a fair trial").
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C.

Frauenberger Was Not Unfairly Prejudiced By The Only Two Instances Of
Alleged Misconduct To Which He Objected At Trial
1.

Any Error Arising From The Testimony Of A State's Witness That
He Believed The Victim Is Harmless Beyond A Reasonable Doubt

While cross-examining the victim, B.H., defense counsel repeatedly
accused B.H. of changing her "story" over the year-and-a-half between the dates
of the charged offenses and the date of trial. (Trial Tr., p.83, L.19 - p.87, L.22.)
During this line of questioning, defense counsel specifically asked B.H.: "And do
you remember the detective [Scott Smith] being concerned with you changing
your story?" (Trial Tr., p.85, Ls.9-10.) The following exchange then took place:
A

What do you mean?

Q

Do you remember him asking you about that?

A

Yes.

Q
Okay. So even the detective was concerned about
trying to pin you down on what really happened and what really
didn't happen?

A

Wait. When did he ask me that?

Q

Do you remember the detective saying this to you:

I'm just shaking my head, because you tell me
something and then you keep adding to it. Are you making any of
this up?
A

Yes, I do.

Q
And because he's been at this over 20 years, and he
was having a hard time with you; wasn't he?

A

Yes.

(Trial Tr., p.85, L.11 - p.86, L.2.)
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Following up on this line of questioning, the prosecutor asked Detective
Smith on direct examination "what was going on" in his interview with B.H. when
he asked B.H. whether she was making anything up.

(Trial Tr., p.232, L.6 -

p.232, L.16.) Detective Smith responded:
That was a lighthearted moment in the interview for sure.
was actually chuckling at her when she said that. Things were
pretty relaxed at that point. I felt like we had a very good rapport
going on. I felt like she was talking, opening up quite a bit. But as
anything else, in conducting one of those interviews, I, you know, I
want to remind people that what they tell me is always open to
question from me. I want to make sure that the information I am
getting is factual and truthful, and I wanted to just portray to her
that I wanted to assure her that I was there to seek the truth and I
wanted to make sure that's what she was giving me.
(Trial Tr., p.232, L.17 - p.233, LA.) The prosecutor then asked Detective Smith
how many 13-year-olds he had interviewed and whether, in his experience,
B.H.'s behavior during her interview was "usual."

(Trial Tr., p.233, Ls.5-15.)

Over defense counsel's objection, Detective Smith testified that B.H.'s behavior
was "fairly typical" because, in his experience, "kids tend to disclose and provide
facts in chunks and in pieces." (Trial Tr., p.233, Ls.16-21.) Defense counsel
again objected, arguing both a lack of foundation and that the detective's
testimony constituted impermissible vouching.

(Trial Tr., p.233, L.22 - p.234,

L.10.) The district court permitted the testimony, ruling that the detective could
refer "to his experience with regards to the demeanor, ... but not as to an actual
weighing of the credibility." (Trial Tr., p.234, Ls.19-22.)
The

prosecutor then

asked

the

detective

about

his

experience

interviewing both adults and children and how, generally, children's responses to
interview questions differ from those of adults' responses. (Trial Tr., p.235, L.1 -
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p.237, L.14.) Detective Smith responded that, as a general matter, children
under 16 "will give you information, but in my experience, you have to ask a lot
more questions of them as you do an adult witness who's, perhaps, over 16 to
get them to put all the pieces together." (Trial Tr., p.237, L.15 - p.238, L.3.)
Tying the detective's general experience directly to his interview with B.H., the
prosecutor asked, "how similar to the general way of answering questions, in
your experience, was [B.H.'s] interview?"

(Trial Tr., p.238, L.4-10.)

The

detective responded:
I was just wanting to - I guess I was wanting to make sure
we weren't getting into a state where we were too comfortable with
each other, and I wanted to communicate to [B. H.] that I wanted to
ensure that she was telling me the truth. And I felt that we were at
a very come [sic] comfortable point in the interview where she was
becoming very comfortable in talking to me. I didn't believe, at
that point, that she was lying necessarily.
(Trial Tr., p.238, Ls.11-19 (emphasis added).)

Defense counsel immediately

objected, and the court sustained the objection, ordered the last sentence of the
detective's answer stricken from the record and instructed the jury "not to
consider the witness' belief as to whether the victim was telling the truth or not."
(Trial Tr., p.238, Ls.20-25.) Defense counsel subsequently moved for a mistrial
based in part on the stricken testimony. (Trial Tr., p.248, L.9 - p.249, L.12) The
court denied the motion, ruling that any error was cured by the giving of the
limiting instruction. (Trial Tr., p.252, L.7 - p.253, L.3.)
Frauenberger

argues

on

appeal

that

the

prosecutor

committed

misconduct and violated his due process right to a fair trial "by asking a witness
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to testify about the credibility of the alleged victim."4 (Appellant's brief, p.22.)
The state notes that the prosecutor never actually asked the detective to testify
about B.H.'s credibility; rather, the prosecutor, in an apparent attempt to rebut
the implication by defense counsel that B.H. had fabricated her "story" during her
interview with Detective Smith, asked the detective whether the manner in which
B.H. responded to his interview questions was typical of a 13-year-old being
interviewed.

Nevertheless, the state acknowledges that the detective's

unsolicited response, "I didn't believe, at that point, that she was lying
necessarily," violated the court's earlier ruling prohibiting "an actual weighing of
[B.H.'s] credibility" and injected into the trial evidentiary error.

See State v.

Herrera, 152 Idaho 24,266 P.3d 499 (Ct. App. 2012) (opinion of one witness as
to truthfulness of another witness is generally inadmissible because it invades
province of jury and does not assist trier of fact as required by !.R.E. 701 and
702). The state also acknowledges that, because Detective Smith was an officer
of the state, his unsolicited testimony "will be imputed to the State for the
purposes of determining prosecutorial misconduct." State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho
53, 61, 253 P.3d 727, 735 (2011).

Contrary to Frauenberger's assertions,

4 As an alternative to his claim of a due process violation based on his two
preserved claims of prosecutorial misconduct, Frauenberger argues on appeal
that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion for a mistrial.
Because, for the reasons set forth herein, the alleged errors were harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt, Frauenberger has failed to establish an abuse of
discretion in the denial of his motion. See
- State v. Watkins, 152 Idaho 764, - -,
274 P.3d 1279, 1281 (Ct. App. 2012) (citations omitted) ("The trial court's refusal
to declare a mistrial will be disturbed only if [the event that triggered the motion],
viewed retrospectively, amounted to reversible error.").
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however, a review of the record and of the applicable law shows that the
complained of error is harmless and did not deny Frauenberger a fair trial.
Immediately after Detective Smith testified that he did not believe B.H.
was "necessarily" in her interview, the district court sustained defense counsel's
objection to the testimony, ordered that it be stricken and instructed the jury to
not consider the detective's "belief as to whether the victim was telling the truth
or not." (Trial Tr., p.238, LS.17 -25.) Ordinarily, "[w]here a defendant's objection
to alleged misconduct is sustained, there is no ruling unfavorable to the
defendant for [the appellate court] to review or reverse." State v. Marmentini,
152 Idaho 269, _ , 270 P.3d 1054, 1056 (Ct. App. 2011) (citations omitted).
Recently, however, the Idaho Court of Appeals held that, because "prosecutorial
misconduct may so infect the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting
conviction a denial of due process even when objections are sustained, ... the
trial court's decision to sustain or overrule a contemporaneous defense objection
to the prosecutor's comment is not determinative of whether this Court will review
the issue."

1.9.:. at _ , 269 P.3d at 1056-57 (citations omitted). "Instead, whether

the trial court sustains an objection to an impermissible question, or whether the
prosecutor is allowed to refer to impermissible information in his or her closing
arguments, are questions that are relevant to the harmless-error inquiry, or to
deciding whether the error made the trial fundamentally unfair."

1.9.:. at _ , 269

P.3d at 1057 (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Greer v.
Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 767 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring)). "An error is harmless
if the reviewing court is able to declare beyond a reasonable doubt that the error

30

did not contribute to the verdict."

kl (citing

Perry, 150 Idaho at 219-20, 245 P.3d

at 971-72.)
The error in this case was harmless. The district court sustained defense
counsel's objection to the challenged testimony and instructed the jury to not
consider Detective Smith's opinion of S.H.'s credibility. (Trial Tr., p.238, Ls.2225.) Although not necessarily determinative of the harmless error inquiry, it must
be presumed that the jury obeyed the court's instruction and disregarded the
stricken testimony. State v. Watkins, 152 Idaho 764, _,274 P.3d 1279, 128283 (Ct. App. 2012).
Also significant to the harmless error analysis is the context in which the
challenged testimony arose. See

kl

at _ , 274 P.3d at 1283 (significance of

improperly disclosed information is factor in harmless error analysis).

While

cross-examining S.H., defense counsel quoted a passage from S.H.'s interview
with Detective Smith - "I'm just shaking my head, because you tell me something
and then you keep adding to it. Are you making any of this up?" - and, based on
that passage, led the jury to believe that Detective Smith had concerns about
S.H. changing her "story." (Trial Tr., p.85, L.9 - p.86, L.2.) There was nothing
improper about the prosecutor's attempt to have Detective Smith explain for
himself what he was thinking when he made the statements defense counsel
quoted and to specifically rebut the implication by defense counsel that the
detective did not believe S.H.'s "story." The challenged testimony arose in this
context and, though ultimately improper, was not so significant as to result in the
denial of Frauenberger's right to a fair trial.
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Finally, the evidence against Frauenberger was strong. See Watkins, 152
Idaho at _ , 274 P.3d at 1283 (strength of evidence is factor in harmless error
analysis).

B.H. testified that Frauenberger had sexual contact with her on three

separate occasions and provided her with marijuana on two of those occasions.
(Trial Tr., p.11, L.20 - p.50, L.18.) While no witness testified to ever witnessing
the sexual contact, two witnesses corroborated other aspects of B.H.'s trial
testimony, including the dates, times and locations of the charged crimes. (Trial
Tr., p.140, L.23 - p.155, L.3, p.170, L.11 - p.190, L.8, p.196, L.25 - p.200, L.1.)
One of those witnesses also testified that he was with Frauenberger and B.H. on
one of the occasions B.H. alleged Frauenberger provided her with marijuana and
was specifically asked if he "wanted to smoke weed or get high."

(Trial Tr.,

p.386, Ls.11-22.)
Considering the evidence presented at trial, the context in which the
testimony occurred and the court's curative instruction, there is no reasonable
possibility that Detective Smith's testimony regarding his opinion of B.H.'s
credibility contributed to jury's verdicts.

The error was harmless and did not

deprive Frauenberger of a fair trial.

2.

The Prosecutor's Error In Asking A Witness Whether Frauenberger
Was On Probation For Possessing Marijuana Was Harmless
Beyond A Reasonable Doubt

While questioning Detective Smith about his interview with Frauenberger,
the prosecutor asked: "Did [Frauenberger] indicate to you whether or not he had
ever been placed on probation for having been [sic] possessing marijuana?"
(Trial Tr., p.247, Ls.10-12.) Detective Smith responded, "Yes, he did." (Trial Tr.,
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p.247, L.13.) Defense counsel immediately objected, and the court sustained
the objection. (Trial Tr., p.247, Ls.14-18.) In a hearing outside the presence of
the jury, defense counsel moved for a mistrial.
L.12.)

(Trial Tr., p.248, L.9 - p.249,

The trial court denied the motion, noting with respect to the probation

reference that the detective had already testified, without objection that
Frauenberger had admitted to having smoked marijuana since he was 15 years
old; and ruling that any prejudice could be cured by the giving of a limiting
instruction.

(Trial Tr., p.243, Ls.4-21.) The court thereafter instructed the jury

that the "last question that was asked by the prosecutor will be stricken from the
record and not to be considered by the jury." (Trial Tr., p.254, Ls.16-19.)
On appeal, Frauenberger argues that the prosecutor's question to
Detective Smith "is clearly improper and constitutes prosecutorial misconduct.,,5
(Appellant's brief, p.26.)

Specifically, he argues that "[i]nformation that Mr.

Frauenberger had a criminal record, especially related to possessing marijuana,
when a marijuana charge is at issue, is highly prejudicial ... [and] may interfere
with the jury's ability to make an impartial decision about whether or not Mr.
Frauenberger is innocent of the charges against him." (Id.) Like the prosecutor
below (see Trial Tr., p.249, Ls.15-22), the state concedes on appeal that the
question regarding Frauenberger's probation status was improper. Contrary to
Frauenberger's assertions, however, a review of the record supports the district
court's determination that the error was harmless and did not violate
Frauenberger's right to a fair trial.

5 See footnote 4, supra.
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First, although Frauenberger obviously believes otherwise, the jury was
never actually exposed to information that Frauenberger had a criminal record
relating to marijuana possession.

The prosecutor asked the detective if

Frauenberger indicated "whether or not he had ever been placed on probation"
for marijuana possession. (Trial Tr., p.247, LS.10-12 (emphasis added).) The
detective answered that question,

"Yes,

he did," but defense counsel

immediately objected and, as a result, the detective never testified one way or
the other whether Frauenberger indicated that he had or had not been placed on
probation.

(Trial Tr., p.247, Ls.13-18.) Thus, while the prosecutor's question

may have been improper, there was no prejudicial error because "defense
counsel's timely objection, sustained by the trial court, kept impermissible
evidence from the jury." State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209,230,245 P.3d 961, 982
(2010), quoted in State v. Marmentini, 152 Idaho 269, _ , 270 P.3d 1054, 1058
(Ct. App. 2011).
Second, as alluded to by the district court, when the prosecutor asked the
detective about Frauenberger's probation status, the detective had already
testified, without objection, that Frauenberger admitted to having smoked
marijuana since he was 15. (Trial Tr., p.246, Ls.7-11.) There is no reason to
believe that information that Frauenberger mayor may not have been on
probation for marijuana possession was any more prejudicial than the
information about Frauenberger's admitted illegal marijuana use, to which the
jury had already been exposed.
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Third, the evidence presented by the state in relation to the marijuana
delivery charge was substantial. As noted above, one of the state's witnesses,
Paul Nigg, testified that while in a vehicle with Frauenberger and B.H., he was
asked whether "wanted to smoke weed or get high." (Trial Tr., p.386, Ls.11-22.)
Considering this testimony together with B.H.'s testimony that Frauenberger
provided her marijuana on the same date and time, there is no reasonable
possibility that the prosecutor's question about Frauenberger's probation status
for marijuana possession in any way contributed to the jury's finding that
Frauenberger had delivered marijuana to a person under 18 years old.
Finally, any potential prejudice arising from the prosecutor's question was
cured by the court's admonishment to the jury that the question had been
stricken and was not to be considered. (Trial Tr., p.254, Ls.16-19.) Presuming,
as this Court must, that the jury followed the court's instruction, see,

~,

State v.

Hill, 140 Idaho 625, 631, 97 P.3d 1014, 1020 (Ct. App. 2004), and considering all
of the other factors set forth above, this Court can declare beyond a reasonable
doubt that the complained of error did not contribute to the jury's verdict. The
error was harmless and did not violate Frauenberger's right to a fair trial.

D.

Frauenberger Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error With Respect To
His Unpreserved Claims Of Prosecutorial Misconduct During Closing
Argument
As previously explained, an unpreserved issue may only be considered on

appeal if it "constitutes fundamental error." State v. Johnson, 149 Idaho 259,
265, 233 P.3d 190, 196 (Ct. App. 2010).

In the absence of an objection "the

appellate court's authority to remedy that error is strictly circumscribed to cases
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where the error results in the defendant being deprived of his or her Fourteenth
Amendment due process right to a fair trial in a fair tribunal." State v. Perry, 150
Idaho 209, 224, 245 P.3d 961, 976 (2010). Review without objection will not lie
unless the defendant demonstrates that (1) "one or more of the defendant's
unwaived constitutional rights were violated;" (2) the constitutional error is "clear
or obvious" on the record, "without the need for any additional information"
including information "as to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision;"
and (3) "the error affected the defendant's substantial rights," generally by
showing a reasonable probability that the error "affected the outcome of the trial
proceedings." 1.9.:. at 226, 245 P.3d at 978 (footnote omitted).
On appeal, Frauenberger raises two claims of prosecutorial misconduct
that he argues constitute fundamental error. (Appellant's brief, pp.31-38.) Each
of these claims, however, fails on one or more prongs of the fundamental error
test.
1.

Frauenberger Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error With
Respect To His Unpreserved Claim Of Vouching During Closing
Argument

While discussing the evidence and the jury's duty to make credibility
determinations, the prosecutor made the following comments during closing
argument:
B.H. told you about these behaviors, and she was honest
with you. It's the state's position that she has no impetus to
lie, if she's willing to tell you what a tough kid she was.
(4/28/11 Tr., p.187, Ls.1 0-13 (emphasis added).) Frauenberger did not object to
this argument below, but on appeal he claims that the emphasized statements
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constituted impermissible vouching, rising to the level of fundamental error.
(Appellant's brief, pp.32-34, 36-38.) Frauenberger's argument is without merit
because it ignores both the applicable law and the context in which the
challenged statements were made.
A prosecutor may "express an opinion in argument as to the truth or falsity
of testimony ... when such an opinion is based upon the evidence." State v.
Timmons, 145 Idaho 279,288, 178 P.3d 644, 653 (Ct. App. 2007). A prosecutor
may also argue "that the state's evidence and theory of the case [is] more
convincing."

State v. Gross, 146 Idaho 15, 20, 189 P.3d 477, 482 (Ct. App.

2008). "While the use of disfavored phrases such as 'I think' and 'I believe' is
discouraged, it is misconduct only when the prosecutor attempts to use his
official position or his personal knowledge of the case as a means of inducing
the jury to vote for conviction." State v. Marmentini, 152 Idaho 269, _ , 270
P.3d 1054, 1057 (Ct. App. 2011) (citing State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82,86 n.1,
156 P.3d 583, 587 n.1 (Ct. App. 2007); State v. Rosencrantz, 110 Idaho 124,
131, 714 P.2d 93, 100 (Ct. App. 1986». A prosecutor's opinions and argument
do not constitute vouching unless the prosecutor interjects "personal belief'
regarding the evidence or a witness's credibility, Timmons, 145 Idaho at 289, 178
P.3d at 654, or asks jurors "to make their decision based upon ... the
prosecutor's self-proclaimed moral rectitude and integrity rather than addressing
the evidence," Gross, 146 Idaho at 20, 189 P.3d at 482.
When taken in context, the prosecutor's statements in this case - i.e.,
"[S]he was honest with you. It's the state's position that she has no impetus to
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lie" - cannot reasonably be construed as impermissible vouching. Frauenberger
argues that the statements were a direct comment "that the prosecutor, and all
the official powers behind her position, believed that B.H. was telling the truth,"
and that the statements invited the jury to reach its decision on factors other than
the evidence admitted at trial.

(Appellant's brief, pp.33-34.)

To reach this

conclusion, however, Frauenberger utterly ignores (and apparently asks this
Court to ignore) the fact that the complained of statements were both
immediately preceded and immediately followed by multiple pages of transcript
wherein the prosecutor discussed the evidence and the reasons why, from the
state's perspective, the jury could accept B.H.'s testimony, including the fact that
B.H. told the jury many "embarrassing things about herself."

(See generally

4/28/11 Tr., pp.184-92.) Frauenberger's argument also ignores the fact that the
prosecutor, at the outset of her closing argument, specifically reiterated to the
jury that her argument was not fact and that the jurors were the sole judges of
the witnesses' credibility. (See 4/28/11 Tr., p.184, L.20 - p.185, L.9.)
Because the prosecutor's comments regarding B.H.'s credibility were
based on the evidence presented at trial, rather than on personal belief,
Frauenberger has failed to establish error, much less any constitutional error that
is "clear or obvious" from the record and actually prejudiced Frauenberger's right
to a fair trial. Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. Frauenberger has thus
failed to establish fundamental error entitling him to appellate review of his
prosecutorial misconduct claim.
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2.

Frauenberger Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error With
Respect To His Unpreserved Claim That The Prosecutor Appealed
To The Passions And Prejudices Of The Jury

Frauenberger's final claim of misconduct centers on the fact that the
prosecutor, during closing argument, discussed that fact that B.H. was
particularly vulnerable to Frauenberger's sexual advances, largely because she
did not have any stable adult guidance or supervision. (4/28/11 Tr., p.187, L.13
- p.189, L.8.) The prosecutor referred to B.H. as "prey" and as an "easy target."
(4/28/11 Tr., p.188, L.7 - p.188, L.21.) She also pointed out that it was not easy
for B.H. to testify and noted that B.H. was so nervous that, while testifying "she
peeled the skin off her little finger." (4/28/11 Tr., p.188, Ls.3-8.) At the end of
her argument, the prosecutor asked the jury to
find the defendant guilty, because he is a predator. He preyed on
someone who was vulnerable and weak, and don't let that happen
here in our city, because [B.H.] doesn't have anything except the
law that says people under 16 don't have the capacity to consent.
That's what she has to protect her.
(4/28/11 Tr., p.198, Ls.12-18.)
For the first time on appeal, Frauenberger argues that the prosecutor's
statements were an improper appeal to the passions and prejudices of the jury
and "were calculated to encourage the jury to reach a guilty verdict based on its
emotion and sympathy for B.H., rather than the facts of the case." (Appellant's
brief, pp.35-36.) While it is indeed improper for a prosecutor to utilize emotional
appeals in closing argument, see,

~,

State v. Troutman, 148 Idaho 904, 909,

231 P.3d 549,554 (Ct. App. 2010); State v. Beebe, 145 Idaho 570,575-576,181
P.3d 496, 502 (Ct. App. 2007); State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 87, 156 P.3d 583,
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588 (Ct. App. 2007), Frauenberger has failed to show that the prosecutor's
arguments amounted to an improper emotional plea as opposed to a proper
comment on and summation of the evidence presented at trial.
It is well settled that prosecutors,

like defense attorneys,

have

"considerable latitude in closing argument to the jury and are entitled to discuss
fully, from their respective standpoints, the evidence and the inferences to be
drawn therefrom." State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 280, 77 P.3d 956, 969
(2003); State v. Marmentini, 152 Idaho 269, _ , 270 P.3d 1054, 1056 (Ct. App.
2011).

In discussing S.H.'s vulnerability and nervousness, the prosecutor

repeatedly

referred

characterizations.

to

the

evidence

at

trial

that

(See generally 4/28/11 Tr., pp.187-189.)

supported

those

The prosecutor's

argument, while descriptive, was not overly emotional, and, unlike the facts of
the authority upon which Frauenberger relies, the prosecutor never asked the
jurors to return a guilty verdict to assist in the "solution of some pressing social
problem." See United States v. Weatherspoon, 410 F.3d 1142,1149 (9 th Cir.
2005) (prosecutor's impermissibly appealed to jury's emotion by arguing for a
guilty verdict to rid society of armed felons). Instead, the prosecutor tailored her
argument to the facts of this case and asked the jurors to find Frauenberger
guilty based solely on the evidence that showed he preyed on S.H. by having
sexual contact with her and providing her with marijuana at a point in her life
when she happened to be particularly susceptible to his influence.
Read in context it is clear that the prosecutor's references to B.H.'s
vulnerability were not an inflammatory appeal for the jury to render its decision
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on anything other than the evidence presented at trial. See State v. Adams, 147
Idaho 857,863-64,216 P.3d 146, 152-53 (Ct. App. 2009) (prosecutor's request
for justice for victims not inflammatory appeal to convict on anything other than
evidence

and,

therefore,

not fundamental

error,

where

remarks

came

immediately after description of how the trial evidence proved Adams' guilt).
Frauenberger has again failed to show error, much less any constitutional error
that is "clear or obvious" from the record and actually prejudiced his right to a fair
trial. Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978.

E.

Frauenberger Has Failed To Show Cumulative Error
Frauenberger argues that, even if each of the instances of alleged

prosecutorial misconduct did not amount individually to reversible error, "the
accumulation of the misconduct including the presentation of vouching
testimony, providing the jury with improper information, and appealing to the
passions and prejudices of the jury, influenced the jury and deprived [him] of his
right to a fair triaL"

(Appellant's brief, p.38.)

Frauenberger's argument fails

because he has failed to show that the cumulative effect of the only two errors
he preserved deprived him of a fair trial.
Under the doctrine of cumulative error, a series of trial errors, harmless in
themselves, may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial.

State v.

Martinez, 125 Idaho 445,453,872 P.2d 708,716 (1994). A necessary predicate
to application of the cumulative error doctrine is a finding of more than one error.
State v. Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396, 958 P.2d 22 (Ct. App. 1998). The cumulative
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error analysis does not include errors neither objected to nor found fundamental.
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 230, 245 P.3d 961, 982 (2010).
Even where there are two or more preserved errors, the presence of such
errors alone does not necessarily require reversal of a conviction.
Truman, 150 Idaho 714,

, 249 P.3d 1169, 1180 (Ct. App. 2010).

State v.
U[T]he

Constitution entitles a criminal defendant to a fair trial, not a perfect one."
Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986).
Although the state's concessions that there were two errors in the trial
makes the cumulative error analysis applicable, review shows that Frauenberger
received a fair, if imperfect, trial.

As shown above, in the context of the entire

trial, including the curative instructions that were given, the errors by the
prosecutor in inadvertently soliciting inadmissible evidence and asking an
improper question related to Frauenberger's probation status (to which no
answer was given) did not individually or cumulatively call into question the
fairness of the trial.

V.
Frauenberger Has Failed To Establish An Abuse Of The District Court's
Sentencing Discretion

A.

Introduction
Frauenberger argues that the concurrent unified sentences of 10 years

with two years fixed, imposed upon his convictions for lewd conduct with a minor
child under 16, and four years with one year fixed, imposed upon his conviction
for delivering marijuana to a person under 18 years old, are unduly harsh and
excessive. (Appellant's brief, pp.39-42.) The record, however, clearly supports
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the sentences imposed; Frauenberger has failed to establish an abuse of the
sentencing court's discretion.

B.

Standard Of Review
When a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellate court will review

only for an abuse of discretion. State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d
397, 401 (2007).

The appellant has the burden of demonstrating that the

sentencing court abused its discretion.

C.

19.:.

Frauenberger Has Failed To Establish That His Sentences Are Excessive
Under Any Reasonable View Of The Facts
Frauenberger was convicted, after a three-day jury trial, of three counts of

lewd conduct with a minor under 16 and one count of delivering marijuana to a
person under 18 years old. (R., pp.107-08, 112-18.) The victim, B.H., was just
13 years old when Felder gave her marijuana and engaged in sexual activities
with her that included both manual-to-genital and oral-to-genital contact. (Trial
Tr., p.11, L.20 - p.50, L.18.) Despite the fact that the jury found Frauenberger
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the charged crimes, Frauenberger has
never accepted responsibility nor expressed any remorse for his actions. (PSI,
pp.2, 8, 12; Psychosexual Eval., pp.2, 4-6.) Frauenberger's character, together
with the seriousness of the offenses and his as-yet undetermined risk to
reoffend, all support the reasonableness of the sentence imposed.
Where a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden
of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 Idaho
576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11
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P.3d 27 (2000)). To carry this burden the appel/ant must show that the sentence
is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. Baker, 136 Idaho at 577,
38 P.3d at 615. A sentence is reasonable, however, if it appears necessary to
achieve the primary objective of protecting society or any of the related
sentencing goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution.

kL.

In fashioning an appropriate sentence, the district court specifically
considered the objectives of sentencing (Sentencing Tr., p.415, L.3 - p.417,
L.21), the presentence report (Sentencing Tr., p.392, Ls.19-23, p.419, Ls.19-23),
the substance abuse report (Sentencing Tr., p.392, Ls.19-23), and the
psychosexual evaluation, in which the evaluator stated that, based on
Frauenberger's lack of meaningful participation in the sex offender evaluation
process, the evaluator was "not able to provide a reasonable assessment of Mr.
Frauenberger's risk of sexual offending in the future, other than to state that his
risk level is indeterminate at this time" (Sentencing Tr., p.392, Ls.19-23, p.419,
Ls.19-23; Psychosexual Eva/., p.9).

The court reviewed nature of the crime,

including Frauenberger's and the victim's relative ages, the type and extent of
sexual touching involved, the fact "that it wasn't a one-time event or an isolated
event, but it was performed [on] more than one occasion," and the fact that
Frauenberger provided B.H. with marijuana.

(Sentencing Tr., p.417, L.22 -

p.419, L.18.) Based upon all of the information before it, including a review of
Frauenberger's lengthy history of juvenile adjudications and his self-reported
history of having had an "extremely active sexual history beginning at [his] own
age of 13," the court ultimately concluded that the imposition of an aggregate 10-
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year sentence, with a two-year fixed term, was necessary to protect society. (Tr.,
p.419, L.19 - p.422, L.20.)
On appeal, Frauenberger does not even address the nature of the
offenses or whether the sentence imposed was necessary to achieve the
objectives of sentencing. Instead, he claims that the district failed to "properly
consider" factors that he claims are mitigating, including his "young age, family
support, status as a first time felony offender, and substance abuse coupled with
a need for treatment." (Appellant's brief, pp.40-42.) This argument fails to show
an abuse of discretion for two independent reasons.
First, all of the information Frauenberger claims the district court should
have considered was included in the sentencing materials the court reviewed
and was otherwise before the court at the time of sentencing. (See PSI, pp.1-8,
10-12; Substance Abuse Report, pp.2-9; Sentencing Tr., p.394, L.10 - p.399,
L.12.) The court obviously considered this information, as it specifically advised
Frauenberger that it "recognize[d] the family support you do have with regards to
your father" (Sentencing Tr., p.413, L.25 - p.414, L.1) and had taken into
account Frauenberger's age and criminal history (Sentencing Tr., p.418, Ls.7-18,
p.420, L.20 - p.421 , L.9). Because Frauenberger has not shown that the court
did not consider the factors he claims are mitigating there is no basis for his
claim that the district court abused its sentencing discretion.
Second, while the factors Frauenberger claims are mitigating may have
some relevancy to sentencing, a sentencing court is not required to assess or
balance all of the sentencing goals in an equal manner. State v. Dushkin, 124

45

Idaho 184, 186, 857 P.2d 663, 665 (Ct. App. 1993). As the district court in this
case pointed out, Frauenberger repeatedly victimized a 13-year-old girl but, as
was his constitutional right to do, refused to meaningfully participate in the
psychosexual evaluation that was designed to determine whether Frauenberger
posed a threat to reoffend.

(Sentencing Tr., p.419, Ls.3-5, p.420, LsA-11.)

Absent any definitive risk assessment, and considering Frauenberger's criminal
and sexual histories, the district court considered Frauenberger a threat to public
safety and determined that the sentence imposed was necessary to protect the
community. (Sentencing Tr., p.420, L.9 - p.421, L.24.) That the court did not
elevate the mitigating factors Frauenberger cites above the need to protect
society does not establish an abuse of discretion. Given any reasonable view of
the facts, Frauenberger has failed to establish that his sentence is excessive.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment and
sentences entered upon the jury verdicts finding Frauenberger guilty of three
counts of lewd conduct with a minor child under 16 years old and one count of
delivering marijuana to a person under 18 years old.
DATED this 5th day of September 2012.
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